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Abstract 
We examine the impact of China’s anti-corruption campaign on firm-level financial reporting 
quality (FRQ). As an important component of the anti-corruption campaign, in October 2013, 
“Rule 18” was issued to prohibit party and government officials from serving as directors for 
publicly listed firms. The regulation led to a large number of official directors resigning from 
their roles as directors involuntarily. As such, Rule 18 has effectively weakened, if not fully 
discontinued, the political connections of the firms that previously hired officials as directors. 
Our empirical analyses employ a difference-in-differences research design with firm fixed effects 
and PSM to examine the pre- and post- period FRQ around the enactment of Rule 18. We find 
that, compared to propensity-score-matched control firms, FRQ of firms with resigned official 
director increases after Rule 18. Further evidence suggests that the impact is stronger when firms 
are located in regions with more developed financial markets and in regions with higher judiciary 
efficiency. We also find that the effect is more pronounced when firms are non-state-owned, 
received preferential credits, and face refinancing pressure.  
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China’s Anti-Corruption Campaign and Financial Reporting Quality 
1. Introduction 
In November of 2012, Xi Jinping became the “paramount leader” of China (i.e., General 
Secretary; President; and Chair of the Central Military Commission). Shortly after he took power, 
Xi launched a far-reaching anti-corruption campaign, vowing to maintain a “zero-tolerance attitude 
toward corruption” and to “look into every case involving corruption.”1 As of 2017, more than 
100,000 people have been indicted for corruption, and 120 high-ranking officials, including five 
national-level leaders, have been targeted. The campaign has shown no sign of stopping yet, and is 
said to become the “new normal.”2  
As one important action of the anti-corruption campaign, the Communist Party of China (CPC) 
issued “Rule 18” on October 19, 2013. Realizing that unduly close connections between business 
and officials could foster corruption, Rule 18 mandates that party and government officials above 
certain ranks, either currently in position or retired within three years, are prohibited from holding 
any part-time or full-time position in any enterprises. Rule 18 forced officials to resign from listed 
firms immediately, aiming to curb possible corruption relating to those firms that previously 
established political connections via hiring officials. The regulation thus triggered an unprecedented 
                                                 
1 See http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-07/01/content_25936928.htm 
2 See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Anti-corruption_campaign_under_Xi_Jinping; 
 http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2015-03/02/content_19695097.htm;   
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large-scale tide of director resignations.  
In this paper, we utilize the issuance of Rule 18 as a quasi-experiment to investigate the 
effect of anti-corruption reforms on firm-level financial reporting quality (FRQ). Corruption is an 
important issue in developing and transitional economies, and has attracted much attention from 
economists and policy makers (e.g., Bardhan 1997; Ades and Di Tella 1999; Cai et al. 2011). 
However, most previous research examines whether corruption reduces economic growth at the 
macro level. Also, although many countries put in efforts to curb corruption, the evidence of the 
effects of anti-corruption is rare. Rule 18 directly affects a group of firms that can be identified 
through analyses of the resignation announcements, therefore it provides an opportunity to examine 
firm-level effects of anti-corruption efforts. We focus on firm-level FRQ, which the literature has 
found to have a significant effect on the cost of capital (e.g., Bhattacharya et al. 2011), investment 
efficiency (e.g., Biddle et al. 2009), development of financial markets (e.g., Rajgopal and 
Venkatachalam 2011), and economic growth (e.g., Li and Shroff 2010).  
When firms hire officials as directors, they establish a political connection with the 
government. This connection can serve as a channel for political rent-seeking and corruption. 
Because the Chinese government plays an especially important role in the economy, these directors 
may help firms to gain a variety of preferential treatments, such as preferential bank credit (e.g., 
Claessens et al. 2008), more government subsidies or government contracts (e.g., Agrawal and 
Knoeber 2001), and favorable court outcomes (e.g., Lu et al. 2015). As a result, these firms have 
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less incentive to provide high quality financial reporting. When the anti-corruption campaign cuts 
the connection by forcing the officials to resign, these firms lose preferential treatments and 
therefore may be incentivized to improve FRQ.  
That forcing directors with political connections to resign would improve FRQ is not a priori 
obvious. The background of these directors is publicly disclosed and the employment relationship is 
public information, therefore these firms and hired officials may be subject to stricter media 
scrutiny. Thus, firms with official directors may have incentive to maintain high FRQ in order to 
signal their commitment to investor protection. 
We utilize Rule 18 as an exogenous shock and use a difference-in-differences design with firm 
fixed effects to compare the effect of losing official directors on FRQ for firms affected by Rule 18 
to a propensity-score-matched (PSM) control group. Following prior studies (e.g., Krishnan et al. 
2011; Dou et al. 2018), we operationalize FRQ using two measures of accrual earnings management 
and one measure of real earnings management (and then combine these into our aggregate FRQ 
measure). We find that firms that lose official directors due to the enactment of Rule 18 
significantly improve their FRQ compared to the control firms (and thus their financial transparency 
is enhanced).  
We then examine the effects of institutional environments. First, the market system relies on 
financial information to allocate resources and more developed markets have higher demand for 
FRQ. Therefore, in regions with more developed markets, firms that previously gained access to 
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scarce resources through political connections (or corruption) have greater incentives to improve 
their reporting quality. We find that the increase in FRQ is more pronounced when firms are located 
in the region with more developed market system. Second, the effectiveness of the anti-corruption 
campaign may rely on the effectiveness of legal enforcement. We partition the sample based on the 
efficiency of the judiciary system in China, and find that the effect is more pronounced in the 
subsample with a more efficient judiciary system. These findings are consistent with Svensson 
(2005) and Lin et al. (2016), and suggest that institutional developments are vital to the 
effectiveness of anti-corruption. 
We further explore firm-level heterogeneity. First, we find that the effects are stronger for 
non-state-owned firms than for state-owned firms (SOEs), suggesting that political connections 
through directors are more important for non-SOEs. Second, we find that the impact is stronger 
when firms benefited from lower financing costs before Rule 18, and when firms face refinancing 
pressure. These results are consistent with the idea that official directors may help firms to access 
preferential financing. After the resignation of the directors, those firms have to rely on the market 
for financing and therefore provide financial reporting with higher quality.  
In supplemental tests, we examine the consequence of anti-corruption campaign and the 
moderating effects of the change in FRQ. We show that treatment firms receive lower subsidies 
from the government and have less access to long-term bank loans after losing politically-connected 
directors, which is consistent with a reduction in preferential treatment for these firms. We also find 
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that treatment firms with increases in FRQ are better able to access the public financial market. 
We conduct several robustness tests to further validate our findings. First, other events that 
occurred during this period in China could potentially confound our results. Because our research 
design controls for the time trend in FRQ, only events that would systematically affect the treatment 
and control firms could affect our inferences. We consider two events that could possibly have 
different effects on the treatment and control firms: the “Eight-Point Regulation” in 2012 (another 
example of the government’s anti-corruption efforts), and the market-liberalization reform of 2015. 
Our inferences are not impacted in these robustness tests. 
Second, we carry out two sets of placebo tests. Rule 18 affects another group of directors who 
have similar civil-service ranks but no political connections in substance - university professors, 
leaders in publicly-funded organizations, and senior managers in SOEs. Because these individuals 
have no substantial political influence either in the government or the party, we expect their 
resignations not to affect FRQ. We use such firms as pseudo-treatment firms, and do the similar 
analyses. The results indicate that there is no significant change in FRQ for such firms. We also use 
other years as “pseudo-event” years, and do not find significant differences in FRQ between 
treatment and control firms around these pseudo-events.  
Third, we manually collect detailed data on personal characteristics and professional 
backgrounds of both the resigned official directors and the successor directors for the treated firms. 
We include controls for these characteristics. The results indicate that personal characteristics of 
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resigned official directors affect the change of FRQ, while personal characteristics of replacement 
directors have no effect. More importantly, our main conclusions do not change. 
Our paper contributes to the literature in the following ways. First, our paper relates to the 
understanding of the effect of China’s anti-corruption campaign. The large scale anti-corruption 
campaign in China has attracted interest from academia (see Lin et al. 2016; Ke et al. 2017; Griffin 
et al. 2018). These studies use the whole anti-corruption campaign as an event that simultaneously 
affects all firms in the country, and rely on time-series differences to identify the effects of anti-
corruption. We examine Rule 18, which focuses on officials who hold positions in listed companies, 
and affects only a group of firms. We can therefore use firms that are not affected by Rule 18 as a 
natural control sample, and identify the effects of anti-corruption using a difference-in-differences 
design. Our article is among the first to investigate the effects of the Chinese anti-corruption 
campaign in general, and is the first paper that examines the impact of Rule 18 on FRQ. 
Second, corruption is an important issue in developing and transitional economies, and 
fighting corruption is a challenging task around the world (e.g., Khwaja and Mian 2005; Olken 
2007). Previous studies on the effects of corruption typically focus on the real economic activities at 
the macro level, and the debate about the influence of corruption on economic efficiency and 
growth is still ongoing. Rule 18 provides a unique setting to examine the effects of the interplay of 
macroeconomic (or political) changes and institutional factors on firm-level FRQ. Because FRQ 
plays an important role in investment efficiency, the development of financial market, or even 
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economic growth, our evidence that FRQ improves as a result of the anti-corruption campaign 
suggests a channel through which anti-corruption campaign can positively affect economic 
efficiency and growth.  
Third, we examine whether the effects of anti-corruption campaign vary with institutional 
development. China’s market and legal institutions vary significantly across regions (Wang et al. 
2008). Taking advantage of this natural laboratory, we show that the anti-corruption campaign 
exerts a stronger positive influence on firms in provinces with more developed markets and more 
efficient legal systems, which is consistent with Svensson (2005) that institutional development is 
crucial to the effectiveness of anti-corruption programs. Our findings provide policy implications 
for other emerging countries that have also launched periodic campaigns to fight corruption.  
Fourth, our paper relates to and complements prior studies on political connections. Hiring 
officials as directors is a form of political connection. Previous literature only identifies political 
connections with high-level politicians, such as prime ministers or members of parliament. Faccio 
(2006) suggests that firms’ connections with local officials may be more important than their 
connections with high-level government officeholders, therefore inferences from high-level 
connections cannot be easily generalizable to lower-level connections. Our article fills in the gap by 
identifying political connections with lower-level officials, as such, it extends previous studies and 
provides a more complete assessment of the impact of political connections on FRQ. 
Finally, our study establishes a causal effect of political connections on FRQ. Firms 
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strategically develop their political connections, so endogeneity issues are an important concern to 
understand the relation between political connections and FRQ. For example, using an international 
dataset on corporate political connections developed by Faccio (2006), Chaney et al. (2011) 
conclude that the presence of connections is associated with lower accounting quality. In contrast, 
we utilize an economically important regulatory change as a quasi-experiment, thus providing much 
stronger support for the causal effect of political connections on FRQ. We find that the ceasing of 
political ties via the politically-connected directors improves FRQ, suggesting a negative effect of 
having political ties on FRQ. We also take advantage of the heterogeneity of regional development 
and firm characteristics and execute cross-sectional analyses, deepening our understanding of 
political connections.  
 
2. Institutional Background, Prior Research, and Hypothesis Development 
2.1 China’s anti-corruption campaign 
Corruption has been a hotly contested issue for several decades. Previous studies suggest that 
corruption can distort resource allocation by diverting capital and talents toward political rent-
seeking activities (Murphy et al. 1991), reduce investment and innovation (Mauro 1995), increase 
the scale of the informal economy (Friedman et al. 2000), and hinder urbanization (Li 2001), 
therefore generally there exists a negative correlation between corruption and GDP growth (World 
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Development Report 20023). 
China is sometimes viewed as an exception (Svensson 2005). In the past 30 years, China’s 
economy maintained a high speed of growth and has become the second-largest economy in the 
world. At the same time, China also has a severe corruption problem, with a corruption perception 
index of 37 and world ranking of 83.4 Some researchers suggest that corruption may act as lubricant, 
and an investment in official connections can “grease the gears” of the bureaucracy and allow firms 
“get things done” (Li et al. 2008). 
After Jinping Xi became the President of China and General Secretary of the CCP in 2012, he 
warned that corruption, if not constrained, will “destroy the party and the nation,”5 and launched a 
large-scale anti-corruption campaign. The campaign has so far investigated and removed five 
national-level leaders and hundreds of high-ranking party and government officials.  
The large scale of the anti-corruption campaign in China has attracted intensive attention from 
both the press and academia. For example, Griffin et al. (2018) and Lin et al. (2016) examine the 
effect of the Eight-Point Regulation and document a positive market reaction to the policy. They 
also find that firms reduce entertainment expenses and increase operating performance after the 
policy. Ke et al. (2017) find that the anti-corruption campaign reduces luxury-goods consumption. 
                                                 
3 https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/5984  
4 https://www.transparency.org/cpi2015#downloads  
5 See https://cn.nytimes.com/china/20121120/c20corruption/zh-hant/?mcubz=0 
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Although these findings are interesting, these studies use the whole anti-corruption campaign as an 
event that simultaneously affects all firms in the country, and rely on time-series differences to 
identify the effects of anti-corruption. As a result, their findings could be contaminated by 
confounding events.  
 
2.2 Official directors and Rule 18 
As one of the significant measures of anti-corruption campaign, the Organization Department 
of the CCCPC released “Rule 18” on October 19, 2013 with a formal title of “To further regulate 
the officials who take positions in enterprises.” The purpose of Rule 18 is said to “enforce strict 
requirements with cadre” and “to fight against corruption.” This regulation forbids all party and 
government officials above certain ranks from taking any position in enterprises on either a part-
time or a full-time basis. Because the anti-corruption campaign was implemented with unusually 
strong force6 and Rule 18, as an important component of the campaign, was issued by the CCCPC 
and has very high authority, 7  the policy has triggered a large-scale tide of official director 
                                                 
6 Wikipedia: “The campaign ... as the largest organized anti-graft effort in the history of Communist rule in China. The 
extent and reach of the campaign has surprised even the most seasoned Chinese political observers.” Similarly, from 
Xinhua we have “zero tolerance for corruption” “wherever offenders may flee, they shall be brought back and brought 
to justice.” 
7 Rule 18 was issued by the Organization Department of the Central Committee of the CPC (CCCPC). The CPC has not 
only power over the government, but also over a variety of laws and regulation. The CCCPC is responsible for 
promotions and demotions of all high-level officials, both in the government and in the CPC. Therefore, rules issued by 
CCCPC have very high authority. 
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resignations within a short period.8 
In China, hiring officials and just-retired officials as directors was a common practice in 
publicly listed firms. In our sample, about 15 percent of the listed firms had hired officials as 
independent directors prior to Rule 18. Firms’ preference for such directors is caused by two 
distinctive features that differentiate China from western countries. First, the Chinese government 
plays a central role in the economy. The government directly controls a large group of enterprises as 
well as the financial market. More generally, the government has a particularly significant role in 
allocating scarce resources, and it can intervene in judicial and regulatory decisions at its discretion. 
While the Chinese capital market has grown rapidly in the last 25 years, the regulatory regime has 
not kept pace with the developments in the financial market. China still has a weak legal system and 
inadequate investor protection. 
The other distinctive feature of China is a heavy emphasis on relationship-management in the 
economy. It is commonly believed that relationships (or social networks) - Guanxi - serve as 
substitutes for formal institutional development or formal contracts in the course of business (Gold 
and Guthrie 2002). Allen et al. (2005) document that Chinese firms rely on relationships or informal 
channels to access various resources.  
                                                 
8  See http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/s/20140307/015318431403.shtml, http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2014/06-
03/6238320.shtml, http://finance.people.com.cn/money/n/2014/0423/c42877-24930194.html. Because the potential 
penalties for non-compliance are severe, it is unlikely that officials would take a risk to get the benefits of serving as 
directors. Empirically we find that almost all official directors resigned within a very short period. 
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Because of the above two features, it is not surprising that firms in China attempt to establish 
such connections with officials or political leaders (Fan et al. 2007; Hung et al. 2012; Hope et al. 
2019a,b). Hiring officials as directors is a method to establish the connection. Officials who serve in 
the firm receive compensation from the firm, and enjoy perks. As a payback, they can bring various 
preferential treatments for the firms (Li et al. 2008). The government clearly believes that hiring 
official directors is a political rent-seeking activity that can foster corruption; therefore it issued 
Rule 18 to force these officials to resign.  
Rule 18 provides an ideal setting to investigate the economic consequences of anti-
corruption campaign at the firm level. It affects only a group of firms and aims to curb one specific 
form of political rent-seeking activity. Therefore, we can clearly identify treated firms and control 
firms, and use a difference-in-differences research design to observe the effects of the anti-
corruption campaign at the firm level. We focus on firm-level FRQ. Financial reporting and 
earnings are important information provided by the listed firms and have important influences on 
the information environment. Previous studies suggest that high quality financial reporting helps to 
mitigate agency problems and reduce information asymmetry among investors (Bushman and Smith 
2001), therefore leads to lower cost of capital, more efficient investment, and higher economic 
growth (See for example, Biddle et al. 2009; Li and Shroff 2010; Bhattacharya et al. 2011). 
Understanding the effects of anti-corruption on firm-level FRQ is useful to evaluate the 
effectiveness of the policy and the channels through which the policy affects the economy. 
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2.3 Political connections and FRQ 
By hiring officials as directors, firms establish a political connection with the government. 
Rule 18 forces those official directors to resign, therefore effectively cutting the political 
connections of firms that hired official directors. Political connections are a widespread 
phenomenon around the world. Firms with political connections can achieve a variety of 
preferential treatments, such as access to bank financing (Claessens et al. 2008), lax regulations 
(Berkman et al. 2010), and government bailouts (Duchin and Sosyura 2012). 
Chaney et al. (2011) conclude that the presence of connections is associated with lower 
accounting quality. However, because firms strategically choose to establish political connections, 
there is an inherent endogeneity problem between accounting quality and such connections, which 
is difficult to tackle using cross-sectional analyses.9 Rule 18 provides a useful setting to study the 
causal effect of political connections on FRQ.10 First, it is an exogenous event (at least at the firm 
level) that forced hundreds of directors to resign. The political connections through those directors 
                                                 
9 The endogeneity problems of reverse causality and omitted variable bias are especially pertinent. Not only can 
political connections affect FRQ, FRQ may also affect political connections. For example, firms with lower FRQ may 
choose to establish political connections, leading to a negative relation. With respect to the correlated omitted variables 
problem, as but one example, low-quality corporate governance may affect both political connections and FRQ at the 
same time. 
10 Using other settings and relatively small samples, Batta et al. (2014), Chi et al. (2016), and Fan et al. (2014) find 
either the opposite of what we find or no effects, thus providing further tension to our hypothesis. Similar to Chaney et 
al. (2011), these studies do not employ as strict a research design as we do in this paper. 
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are therefore cut off, or at least weakened significantly, after the resignations. Director departures 
are usually strategic and determined by director and firm characteristics (Fahlenbrach et al. 2017). 
Previous studies utilize sudden deaths to investigate the value of independent directors or political 
connections (e.g., Fisman 2001; Faccio and Parsley 2009; Nguyen and Nielsen 2010). Although 
those are interesting events, the samples are very small (and the research questions are not about 
FRQ). In contrast, Rule 18 caused a large number of director resignations due to explicit and 
exogenous reasons, and we use the event to examine the effects of political connections on FRQ. 
Second, this context provides an effective way to identify political connections. We thus 
extend previous studies that use different measures for political connections. For example, Faccio 
and Parsley (2009) use geographic proximity to politicians, and Yu and Yu (2011) employ firms’ 
lobbying activities as proxies. These measures are likely noisier measures of political connections 
than directors with a direct connection to the government. Rule 18 is a plausibly exogenous event 
and as such allows us to better measure the politically-connected directors. Because these connected 
directors are forced to resign in a short period and these resignations need to be publicly disclosed, 
we can manually verify the reasons for the resignations. 
Third, existing studies often employ cross-country data, which raises concerns regarding 
endogeneity, the availability of variables at the country level, noisy variables, and the possibility of 
correlated omitted variables (Miller 2004). Cross-country studies are also affected by differences in 
legal, judicial, and cultural factors, which make it hard to disentangle firm-level effects from 
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country-level factors (Gul 2006). The different disclosure regulations across countries further add 
noise to the data (Faccio 2006). Because we focus on a large sample of firms in one particular 
country, these concerns are mitigated in our setting. 
 
2.4 Hypothesis development 
Political connections can negatively affect FRQ for the following reasons. First, high quality 
financial information is fundamental to the development of financial markets. Because connected 
firms gain access to preferential financing, they may attach lower importance to external investors. 
As a result, they have reduced incentives to provide high quality financial reporting. Second, 
politically-connected firms establish connections to derive gains, and these gains are often in the 
gray area or of dubious legality (Fisman 2001). Therefore, insiders may want to obscure reported 
earnings in order to obfuscate the gains from those connections. Third, regulators require firms to 
provide high-quality information, and they penalize firms that fail to follow rules. However, the 
regulatory monitoring is less severe for politically-connected firms (Yu and Yu 2011). Finally, 
connected firms not only enjoy the benefits but also carry some political burdens. For example, 
Piotroski et al. (2015) indicate that Chinese politicians prefer to suppress negative information 
during specific time periods, such as elections or political events. Therefore, the information of 
politically-connected firms can be distorted by political needs. 
On the other hand, Li and Shen (2010) find that in China negative media coverage triggers 
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further investigation by the government (see also Hope et al. 2019a), and that the affected officials 
are more likely to lose positions or their promotion opportunity. Therefore, politically-connected 
firms may have incentives to provide high-quality earnings information. Second, previous literature 
suggests that firms may use earnings management as a short-term mechanism to enhance perceived 
firm performance and access to equity financing (e.g., Teoh et al. 1998; Kothari et al. 2016). Since 
the politically connected firms receive preferential treatments such as access to bank loans and 
government subsidiaries, they rely less on the equity market, which may blunt their incentives to 
manipulate earnings. Finally, connected firms may be more likely to expropriate minority 
shareholders. Given that outside investors prefer high quality accounting information as a 
protection, insiders could provide high quality financial reporting to signal to outside investors. 
Taken together, although we on balance expect a negative relation between political 
connections and FRQ, this prediction is not tautological. In addition, FRQ may affect the 
establishment of political connections. For example, firms with low FRQ may choose to establish 
connections in order to receive preferential treatments. Because of these empirical challenges, we 
believe that the nature of Rule 18 and the differences-in-differences methodology are especially 
useful. The resignation of directors due to Rule 18 effectively severs the political connections 
between the firm and politicians. To summarize, by observing the change of FRQ around Rule 18, 
we can identify the causal effect of these connections. Our primary hypothesis is stated as follows 
in the null form: 
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HYPOTHESIS 1. The financial reporting quality of firms with politically-connected directors 
does not change after the enactment of Rule 18. 
 
3. Sample and Research Design 
3.1 Sample selection 
We start our sample with all firms listed on the Main and SME boards of China’s stock 
markets.11 To identify the treated firms, we carry out several steps as the following: First, we hand 
collect all resignation announcements of directors from the introduction of Rule 18 until April 30, 
2015, the mandatory deadline for 2014 annual reports. 12  If the resignation announcements 
explicitly state that the director has to resign from the firm to comply with Rule 18, we include 
them in the treatment group. Second, some firms tend to blur the true reason by providing 
ambiguous statements such as “due to personal reasons” in the resignation announcements. To 
mitigate any possible omissions for announcements without explicit explanations, we check the 
background of these resigned directors to identify whether the director is affected by Rule 18. 
Specifically, we collect the background information from each director’s resume which is obtained 
                                                 
11  Our sample does not include firms listed on ChiNext, which is established to attract small and fast-growing 
enterprises, especially high-tech firms. The listing standards of ChiNext are less stringent than those of the Main and 
SME Boards. 
12 In follow-up analysis we confirm that Rule 18 was highly effective and nearly all of official directors resigned before 
the 2014 annual reporting date. 
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from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database and supplemented from 
firms’ home pages and other websites.13 We then examine the directors’ working experience and 
official ranks. If these directors should be constrained by Rule 18, we include them in the treatment 
group.  
Third, although Rule 18 aims to regulate party and government officials, in enforcement the 
policy uses civil-service ranks to identify the person. Because university professors, leaders in 
publicly-funded organizations, and top managers in SOEs in China have similar civil-service ranks 
as government officials, they were also affected by Rule 18 and were forced to resign.14 However, 
these civil-service ranks are not associated with any government power. To assure that the resigned 
directors represent the loss of political connections, we examine their working experiences and 
exclude these cases from the treatment sample. All other firms are control firms when employing 
the full sample, and as candidates as matching firms for tests using PSM.  
To examine the effects of anti-corruption, we collect financial information for the two years 
before and two years after Rule 18. Specifically, since Rule 18 was released in October 2013, we 
                                                 
13 For example, www.baidu.com, http://stockdata.stock.hexun.com, http://stock.jrj.com.cn, http://finance.sina.com.cn, 
http://www.stockstar.com, and http://www.10jqka.com.cn. 
14 Based on a practice that has been followed for several decades, universities, publicly-funded organizations, and SOEs 
are given civil-service ranks equal to those of government departments. For example, prestigious universities usually 
have a civil-service rank of vice-ministerial level, and the leaders of those universities have the civil-service ranks 
similar to vice-minister. Publicly-funded organizations are mostly nonprofit organizations, such as the Chinese 
Academy of Science, General Research Institution for Nonferrous Metals, etc.  
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use 2012 and 2013 as the pre-rule period, while 2014 and 2015 comprise the post-rule period.15 
Financial information is obtained from CSMAR. Following prior literature, we exclude financial 
firms because their financial ratios are not comparable with other firms. We also eliminate firms 
with missing data or negative equity. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles in order to mitigate the effects of outliers. 
 
3.2 Research design 
Our main tests involve DiD analyses using a PSM control group. This methodology compares 
FRQ of a sample of treatment firms with politically-connected directors who have resigned to that 
of control firms (without resigned directors but otherwise comparable), before and after the Rule 18 
- induced director resignations. Our focus is on incremental effects for the treatment sample. 
The DiD approach has several advantages. First, this methodology controls for omitted trends 
that are correlated with FRQ in both the treatment and the control groups. With the development of 
the stock market and the improvement of regulation, Chinese firms may have improved corporate 
governance and FRQ over time (Jiang et al. 2010). Second, the tests are conducted surrounding 
                                                 
15 The policy was issued at the end of 2013, so nearly all affected directors began to resign from 2014. Therefore we 
classify 2013 as pre-policy period. Our inferences are not affected if we exclude 2013 from our sample period or 
employ 2011 and 2012 as the pre-rule period. We also employ a specification that includes four years as pre-rule period 
(i.e. 2010, 2011, 2012, and 2013 as the pre-rule period, and 2014 and 2015 as the post-rule period). Inferences are not 
affected (untabulated). 
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policy changes that cause a change in political connections. This helps to rule out reverse-causality 
concerns, such as directors may choose to resign from more opaque firms. In addition, we include 
industry/firm fixed effects and year fixed effects in the regressions. Firm fixed effects control for any 
time-invariant unobserved differences between the treatment and the control groups. Year fixed 
effects control for any market-wide changes in FRQ.  
The PSM approach generates samples in which treatment firms and control firms are more 
similar, which helps mitigate the possibility that omitted correlated variables are driving our results 
(e.g., Hope et al. 2013). To implement this PSM approach, we first estimate a logit regression using 
the information in the year 2013 to model the probability of being affected by Rule 18 (i.e., whether 
a particular firm has affected official directors). Similar to DeFond et al. (2014), we include all 
independent variables in equation (1) in the PSM model to assure that all known factors that 
potentially affect FRQ are similar across the treatment and control samples. We also include region 
fixed effects to control for potential variation among different provinces. The estimation results of 
the logit model are presented in Appendix A. Next, we calculate the propensity score for each firm 
using the predicted probabilities from the logit model, and match each treatment firm to the control 
firm using the nearest-neighborhood technique without replacement. 
We compare the changes in FRQ among politically-connected firms with non-connected firms 
over the period 2012-2015. In order to perform this comparison, we regress our FRQ measures on 
𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐿𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  that captures the interaction between political connections (boards with 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
  
 
official directors) and the post-policy period, along with a set of control variables. The main 
regression model is as follows: 
𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  =  𝛽𝛽0 + 𝛽𝛽1𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐿𝑖𝑖 × 𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽2𝑃𝑃𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑅𝑅𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐼𝑇𝑇𝐿𝑖𝑖                            +𝛽𝛽4𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑍𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +𝛽𝛽5𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽6𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽7𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝐿𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽8𝐵𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽9𝐷𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑁𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+ 𝛽𝛽10𝑇𝑇𝐺𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽11𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑁𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑁𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝐼𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽12𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽13𝐵𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆𝐼𝑍𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+ 𝛽𝛽14𝐼𝑁𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽15𝑇𝑇𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽16𝑇𝑇𝑁𝑇𝑇𝐿𝑌𝑆𝑆𝑇𝑇𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽17𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽18𝐴𝐴𝑃𝑃𝑇𝑇𝑈𝐴𝐴𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖+ 𝛽𝛽19𝑀𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽20𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝑃𝑃𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑖𝑠 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
(1) 
To proxy for a firm’s financial reporting quality, we use three individual measures, and an 
overall measure (FRQ) that aggregates the three individual measures. The first individual proxy is 
based on discretionary accruals (|DA1|) estimated using the cross-sectional Modified Jones model 
as developed in Dechow et al. (1995). The model controls for industry-wide changes in economic 
conditions that affect total accruals while allowing the coefficients to vary across time. The second 
individual proxy is based on discretionary accruals (|DA2|) estimated using cross-sectional 
performance-adjusted model as developed in Kothari et al. (2005) which further controls for firm 
performance. Higher absolute values of discretionary accruals indicate lower financial reporting 
quality. The third proxy is based on real earnings management (|REM|) following Roychowdhury 
(2006), Zang (2011), and Chen et al. (2015). Higher real earnings management indicates lower 
financial reporting quality. For ease of interpretation, we multiply -1 to each variable (|DA1|, |DA2|, 
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and |REM|), and then standardize (i.e., subtract the mean and divide by the standard deviation) to 
create three individual measures of FRQ (i.e., FRQ1, FRQ2, and FRQ3). The higher the variable, 
the higher quality of financial reporting. Similar to Biddle et al. (2009), we construct an aggregate 
measure (FRQ), which is the average of the three standardized individual measures.16 Please see 
Appendix B for details. 
OFFICIAL is an indicator variable that takes the value of one for firms with resigned official 
directors, and zero otherwise. POST is defined as one when the year is after the issuance of Rule 18, 
(i.e., 2014 or 2015), and zero otherwise. 
To purge the effect of underlying business processes and other fundamental drivers of the 
information quality, we include several control variables that the literature has shown to associate 
with firms’ FRQ (e.g., Dechow and Dichev 2002; Hribar and Nichol, 2007; Daniel et al. 2008; 
Raman and Shahrur 2008; Gopalan and Jayaraman 2012；Chen et al. 2015): firm size (SIZE), long 
term leverage (LEV), capital intensity (PPE), volatility of the operating environment (SDSALES; the 
volatility of sales), systematic risk (BETA), dividend payments (DIVIDEND), and firm age (AGE). 
Next, we include a set of variables to control for corporate governance. Specifically, we incorporate 
ownership concentration (CONCENTRATION), insider’s shareholdings (INSIDER), board size 
(BOARDSIZE), the percentage of independent directors (INDPRO), audit fees (AF), analyst 
                                                 
16 We obtain similar results if we use the first principal factor as the aggregate measure of FRQ. 
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following (ANALYSTS) in our model. 
Previous research indicates that firm growth and firm performance affect FRQ (e.g., Kasznik 
1999; Lee et al. 2006). Therefore we include return on assets (ROA), annual stock returns 
(RETURN), and the market-to-book ratio (MB). We also control for whether the firm is a state-
owned enterprise (SOE). Finally, we include year fixed effects and industry/firm fixed effects.17 We 
cluster standard errors at the firm level to mitigate the overstatement of statistical significance 
owing to serial correlation in the error term (Petersen 2009). All variables are defined in Appendix 
B. 
The major variable of interest is the interaction between political connection and the post-
period (OFFICIAL×POST). The coefficient on the interaction term, 𝛽𝛽1, captures the incremental 
change in FRQ from the pre- to the post-period for firms with resigned official directors relative to 
the change for firms in the benchmark group. A positive (negative) coefficient on 𝛽𝛽1 indicates that 
the cutting-off of connections improves (impairs) FRQ. 
 
                                                 
17 In most of our analyses, we use the most restrictive specification, that is, we include both firm fixed effects and year 
fixed effects. When firm fixed effects are included, OFFICIAL drops out. When year fixed effects are included, POST is 
subsumed. 
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4. Empirical Results 
4.1 The influence of Rule 18 
Table 1 presents the sample-selection procedure. We start from all firms listed on both the 
Main and SME boards of the Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges. After excluding firms in the 
financial industry, we have 2,090 firms and a total of 8,337 independent directors on the date when 
Rule 18 was issued. Among those listed firms and directors, 819 directors were forced to resign 
after Rule 18, which affects a total of 613 firms (or 29% of the whole population of listed non-
financial firms). It is evident that Rule 18 had a highly significant impact on the directors and 
publicly-traded companies. We further remove observations if resigned directors are university 
professors, leaders in publicly-funded organizations, or SOE managers. They have similar civil-
service ranks as officials but are considerably less likely to provide political connections for firms. 
This leaves us with 315 firms. After eliminating firms with missing variables or without appropriate 
PSM matching firms, our final treated group includes 286 firms with 368 resigned official directors. 
The large sample of resigned official directors indicates that listed firms in China were keen to 
hire officials as directors in order to build up political connections. This is consistent with previous 
evidence that firms tend to establish such connections, especially in regions where the government 
plays an important role (e.g., Hillman 2005). The large-scale resignation wave due to this event 
provides us with an ideal setting to study the effect of China’s anti-corruption campaign on FRQ. 
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4.2 Descriptive statistics 
Panel A of Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for our main variables separately in the 
treatment group, control group (No PSM), and control group (PSM) just prior to the event. In the 
column “Treatment-Control (No PSM),” we observe that the treatment and control firms (No PSM) 
have significant differences on many firm characteristics. For example, relative to the control firms, 
treatment firms are larger, have more long term debt, have a larger board of directors, pay higher 
audit fees, and are more likely to be SOEs. These differences suggest the necessity of employing 
PSM. 
Importantly, after we use PSM to identify the control sample, all significant differences are 
eliminated as shown in the column “Treatment-Control (PSM).” We also evaluate the effectiveness 
of PSM by examining whether the covariates are balanced across treatment and control group. In 
untabulated analyses, we find that the mean bias drops significantly from 8.7% before matching to 
4.6% after matching. Thus, the PSM approach is effective in removing meaningful differences in 
the matched variables across the treatment and control groups. 
In Panel B of Table 2, we present firm characteristics for the main sample in our regression 
tests. There are 2,200 firm-year observations for a total of 572 firms (286 matched treated firms and 
286 corresponding control firms) across our entire sample period. In Panel C of Table 2 we provide 
descriptive statistics on personal characteristics of the official directors who were forced to resign. 
We observe that 40% of the resigned directors held government positions in the industry in which 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
  
 
the firm operates, 18 36% held “national rank” (an important dimension in China), most of the 
resigned directors (87%) resided within the same province as the affected firms, the vast majority 
(89%) are male, and 20% are retired. 
Panel D of Table 2 shows the details of the successor directors’ backgrounds. Of the incoming 
directors, 30% have their primary experience within the same industry. In terms of professional 
backgrounds, 54% are from accounting, finance or tax, 15% from law, and 6% from banking. With 
regard to personal characteristics, 83% are male and under 5% are retired. 
 
4.3 The effect of Rule 18 on FRQ 
Table 3 provides our main results. In Panel A, we use all other firms as control firms. In 
models (1)-(3), we use the aggregate measure of financial reporting quality (FRQ) as dependent 
variable and include industry fixed effects, firm fixed effects, and firm and year fixed effects, 
respectively. Our focus is on the incremental effect for the treatment sample. The estimated 
coefficients on  β1(OFFICIAL×POST) are 0.2182, 0.2115, and 0.2083, respectively, and all are 
significant at the 1% level (using two-sided tests). Because the measure of FRQ is standardized, the 
results indicate that firms with resigned official directors have improved their FRQ after the event 
                                                 
18 As an example, if a real-estate development company hires an official director from People's Republic of China 
Ministry of Housing, which has the authority to monitor the operations of the real-estate industry, this official has some 
power related to the real-estate industry. 
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by a significant 20.83%-21.82% of the standard deviation.  
In models (4)-(6), we use three individual measures of FRQ as dependent variables, and 
include both firm and year fixed effects. The estimated coefficients on  β1are all positive and 
significant at the 5% level or better. The empirical results indicate that Rule 18 has similar effects 
on the three individual measures of FRQ, that is, firms with resigned official directors improve their 
financial reporting quality.  
In Panel B, we present results using the aggregate measure of FRQ as dependent variable and 
use PSM firms as control firms19. The PSM procedure generates control firms similar to treatment 
firms, therefore mitigates the effects of possible omitted variables. In models (1)-(3), we include 
industry fixed effects, firm fixed effects, and firm and year fixed effects, respectively. The 
coefficients for the test variable are 0.2038, 0.1791, and 0.1748, respectively (all significant at the 1% 
level).20 Taken together, our results consistently suggest that the firms improve FRQ (and thus their 
financial transparency) after the directors resign. Our results establish a causal relation between 
political connections and FRQ. 
In the following analyses, we focus on the sample with PSM control firms, use the aggregate 
measure (FRQ) as our major dependent variable, and include firm and year fixed effects in our 
                                                 
19 The inferences remain similar when employing each of three individual FRQ measures. 
20 Following previous studies (e.g., Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003; Li et al., 2018), in model (4) we perform a 
dynamic analysis by including OFFICIAL with each year indicator. The evidence indicates that the increase of FRQ of 
treatment firms occurs after the event. 
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models. 
 
5. Cross-Sectional Partitions and Consequences Analyses 
5.1 Institutional development 
We first explore the effects of institutional development. Svensson (2005) points out that anti-
corruption programs rely on legal and financial institutions to enforce and strengthen accountability. 
When these institutions are weak or corrupt themselves, anti-corruption programs are hard to 
succeed. To further understand the effects of anti-corruption on FRQ, we make use of interesting 
within-China variations and examine whether the institutional development has a moderating effect. 
To examine the moderating role of financial market development, we use Fan et al.’s (2011) 
financial-market index to measure the development of financial market. We partition the sample 
based on the median of the province-level financial marketization index. The results in Table 4 
indicate that the test variable is significant at the level of 1% in the group with a more developed 
financial market (0.3348), and insignificant in the group with a less developed financial market 
(0.0219). The Z-statistic shows that the difference between two groups is significant at the 5% level. 
The results are consistent with the argument that financial institutions play a moderating role. 
Before the event, connected firms can gain access to preferential financing, consequently they 
attach lower importance to external investors and have reduced incentives to improve FRQ. After 
the event, connected firms have to rely on the financial market for external financing. A more 
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developed financial market system will impose higher requirements for FRQ, while a less 
developed financial market has less demand for FRQ. These results are also consistent with Lin et 
al. (2016), who find that the anti-corruption campaign has a more positive effect when the market is 
more developed. 
The other institutional development variable that we examine is the effectiveness of law 
enforcement. Although laws and regulations are set at the national level in China, the efficiency of 
enforcement varies significantly across regions. Studies find that enforcement, not merely the 
existence of a policy, is important (Bhattacharya and Daouk 2002; Hope 2003). We use a judiciary-
efficiency index developed by the World Bank to measure the effectiveness of law enforcement.21 
We partition the sample based on the median of province-level court-efficiency index. The results 
in Table 4 suggest that the test variable is significant at the 1% level in the group with greater 
judicial efficiency (with coefficient equal to 0.3767) and is insignificant in the group with lower 
judicial efficiency (with coefficient equal to 0.0423). The Z-statistic shows that the difference 
between two groups is significant at the 5% level. The results are consistent with the argument that 
legal institutions play a moderating role. Because the anti-corruption campaign may rely on legal 
institutions, the effects of anti-corruption policy have larger effects when the legal institutions are 
more efficient. 
                                                 
21 http://www.doingbusiness.org/Reports/Subnational-Reports/China 
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5.2 The effects of firm-level characteristics  
We first examine whether the ownership type of the controlling shareholders matters. Listed 
firms with the government as the largest shareholders (i.e. SOE firms) are generally carved out from 
large state-owned economic groups, and may have political connections by nature. SOE firms often 
receive preferential treatments from banks and government regulations (e.g., Lu et al. 2015; Hope et 
al. 2019a,b), therefore, they may not need to depend on official directors for political connections, 
and the resignations of official directors are expected to have less effect. Panel A of Table 5 
presents the results. OFFICIAL×POST is significant at the 1% level in the non-SOE group (0.3416), 
and insignificant in the SOE group (0.0153). More importantly, the magnitude of  β1 in the non-
SOE group is significantly larger than that in the SOE group (at the 1% level), suggesting that the 
effect of politically-connected directors is more important for non-SOE firms. 
Second, we examine whether financing pressure has moderating effects. One important 
preferential treatment that politically-connected firms can receive is preferential financing. 22 
Therefore connected firms do not face the same level of pressure from external investors who 
usually require high quality information. However, when the political connections are cut off, firms 
                                                 
22 For example, Claessens et al. (2008) find that firms with political connections have more access to bank financing. 
Piotroski and Zhang (2014) show that in China political intervention plays a significant role in the IPO process, and that 
firms gain access to stock-market financing through their connections. Yu et al. (2012) find that political connections 
can mitigate financial constraints, especially for non-SOEs. 
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may need to improve FRQ so as to increase the financing capability and reduce cost of capital. 
Previous studies (such as Bharath et al. 2008; Francis et al. 2005) find that firms with high 
accounting quality have lower cost of debt and equity. Bhattacharya et al. (2011) suggest that there 
are both a direct path from earnings quality to the cost of equity, and an indirect path that is 
mediated by information asymmetry. Kim and Sohn (2013) document that real earnings 
management is associated with higher implied cost of equity. 23 
We use two firm-level conditioning variables. The first variable is the cost of debt before the 
event. Following Pittman and Fortin (2004), we calculate the cost of debt as interest expense 
divided by the amount of interest-bearing debt. When the cost of debt is lower, firms are more 
likely to receive preferential credit, therefore, after the political connection is severed, they will face 
greater pressure from external investors. The second variable is refinancing pressure. We measure 
refinancing pressure using the ratio of short term bank loans as a percentage of total debt. When 
firms face refinancing pressure and cannot access preferential credit, they have greater incentive to 
respond to the demand of information from investors. 
In panel B of Table 5, we report the results. In the first two columns, we partition our 
treatment firms into two subsamples based on the median of cost of debt and assign the control 
                                                 
23 A contra argument is that firms may manipulate earnings upward in order to report good accounting performance and 
get access to external financing. This creates tension for the tests. 
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firms to the same group. 24  We then run regressions in each subsample. We can see that 
OFFICIAL×POST is significantly positive in the group with low cost of debt, while insignificant in 
the group with high cost of debt. The Z-statistic shows that the difference between the two groups is 
significant at the 5% level. The results indicate that firms that received preferential financial 
treatment before the event are more likely to increase their FRQ. 
Similarly, we examine the effects of refinancing pressure and the results are presented in 
Panel B of Table 5. We find that OFFICIAL×POST is significantly positive in the group with high 
refinancing pressure, while insignificant in the group with low refinancing pressure. The Z-statistic 
shows that the difference between two groups is significant at the 5% level. Together, these findings 
provide support for the argument that financing pressure has a moderating effect. When firms 
receive more preferential treatment in terms of credit before the event, or have refinancing pressure, 
the severing of political connections is more likely to increase the pressure from the capital market 
for those firms. Therefore, these firms increase FRQ more. 
 
5.3 Supplemental tests: other consequences of the anti-corruption campaign 
In this section, we provide further evidence on consequences of the anti-corruption campaign 
and on the moderating effects of FRQ. 
                                                 
24 The sample is smaller for this test because we need interest expense and that variable has some missing values in our 
sample. 
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First, we examine the government subsidies that firms received around Rule 18. Government 
subsidies are direct funds from the government, which can boost firms’ operating performance, and 
reduce their reliance on external financing. Losing official directors may lead to the loss of 
government subsidies, which further increases firms’ reliance on external financing. We obtain 
government subsidy data from CSMAR database. To examine the effects of Rule 18 on government 
subsidies, we regress the natural logarithm of government subsidies on OFFICIAL×POST and 
control variables that previous studies suggest affecting government subsidy (e.g., Faccio et al. 
2006; Chen et al. 2008). The results are presented in Panel A of Table 6. Consistent with our 
prediction, we find that the estimated coefficient on OFFICIAL×POST is significantly negative, 
suggesting that firms receive lower subsidies after they lose official directors. Because the 
dependent variable is the natural logarithm of government subsidies, the results suggest that the 
magnitude of decrease is 16.46%.25 
Next, we examine the effect of anti-corruption on long-term bank loans (i.e., a form of 
preferential financing). We include control variables following prior studies (e.g., Custódio et al. 
2013; El Ghoul et al. 2016). The results are also presented in Panel A of Table 6. Consistent with 
our argument, we find that the estimated coefficient on OFFICIAL×POST is significantly negative 
                                                 
25 In our sample, the mean of subsidy/net profit is 25.58% and the mean of subsidy/CFO is 14.57%. So, the decreased 
government subsidies will on average affect profits by 4.21% (=0.1646*25.58%) and operating cash flows by 2.40% 
(=0.1646×14.57%), respectively. 
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(-0.0169), suggesting that treatment firms have less access to preferential bank financing. 
Similarly, in Panel B we test for the effects on public financing, that is, public equity and 
bond financing. The dependent variable is total newly-issued equity and bonds as a percentage of 
total assets. Control variables are based on prior studies (Denis and Mihov 2003; Beck et al. 2008; 
Marshall et al. 2016). The results are presented in Panel B of Table 6. We observe that 
OFFICIAL×POST is insignificant in the whole sample, suggesting that anti-corruption has no effect 
on public financing in general. We further separate the group into two sub-groups based on the 
change in FRQ around the event. We find that OFFICIAL×POST is positive and significant when 
firms have increased FRQ more, and insignificant otherwise. The Z-statistics shows that the 
difference is significant.  
Taken together, the evidence suggests that after Rule 18, formerly politically-connected 
firms receive less in subsidies and preferential bank loans. However, if firms improve their FRQ, 
they can moderate the effects by accessing more public financing.  
 
6. Robustness Tests 
6.1 Potential confounding events 
We consider two potential confounding events that occurred around the event we examine. 
After President Xi Jinping assumed power, the government launched a large-scale anti-corruption 
campaign, and the Eight-Point Regulation was issued on December 4, 2012. The regulation requires 
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government officials to forego conspicuous perks, and was perceived as the launch of China’s anti-
corruption reform. The Eight-Point Regulation regulates the general behavior of government 
officials, while Rule 18 specifically focuses on the officials who serve as directors in firms. Lin et 
al. (2016) find that the market reacts positively to the launch of the Eight-Point Regulation, and 
firms (especially SOE firms) greatly reduce their entertainment and travel costs (ETC), which are 
presumably used for corruption. Griffin et al. (2018) confirm that the Regulation leads to a decrease 
in entertainment expenses, but find no evidence that it affects discretionary accruals, one of their 
measures for corruption. To control the effects of abrupt change of ETC due to the Eight-Point 
Regulation, we add ETC as a control variable and rerun our main tests as in equation (1). The 
results are presented in model (1) of Table 7. We find that controlling for ETC does not change our 
conclusions. To further ensure our results are not driven by the Eight-Point Regulation, we also 
exclude the year 2012 from our sample, which makes our sample years all post the Eight-Point 
Regulation. The results are presented in model (2) of Table 7 and again no inferences are affected.26 
The second potential confounding event we consider is a market-liberalization reform, the 
Shanghai-Hong Kong Stock Connect, which significantly changed the market segmentation in 
China. Through a centralized platform set up by the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Hong Kong 
Stock Exchange, international investors, either institutional or non-institutional investors, can 
                                                 
26 We also test for whether ETC increased for treatment firms in the post period (i.e., whether these firms would incur 
more ETC to rebuild political connections). We do not find any evidence of that (untabulated). 
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directly trade a selected batch of stocks listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange if they have stock 
accounts in Hong Kong. The market-liberalization reform introduces foreign investors and could 
affect FRQ. To control for the effects of the market liberalization, we first include an indicator 
variable, which equals one if the stocks can be directly traded by Hong Kong and international 
investors. The conclusions do not change. Next, we eliminate the year 2015 from our sample, which 
makes our sample years all before the liberalization reform. Our inferences hold again. The results 
are presented in models (3) and (4) of Table 7. 
 
6.2 Placebo tests  
To validate that the change of FRQ is caused by the lost political connections, we execute two 
sets of placebo tests. First, we examine the effect of the resignation of directors who are highly 
unlikely to provide important political connections. If our results are not driven by political 
connections, then we expect that the resignation of these directors will also affect FRQ. We use 
firms with resigned directors from universities, publicly-funded organizations, or SOEs as the 
treated group. We have a total of 298 pseudo-treatment firms, among which 210 are firms with 
resigned directors from universities, 27  70 with resigned directors from publicly-funded 
                                                 
27 The relevant regulation requires that at least one of the independent directors should have accounting expertise. 
Therefore, it was a common practice that university professors who have accounting backgrounds serve as independent 
directors. 
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organizations, and 35 with resigned directors from other SOEs. We use a similar PSM procedure 
and match these firms with control firms using the firm characteristics in the year 2013. We define 
NOFFICIAL as a binary variable that equals to 1 if the firm has forcedly resigned director from 
universities, publicly-funded organizations, or SOEs, and 0 otherwise. We then execute similar DiD 
analyses as in equation (1) and present the results in Panel A of Table 8. The results show that 
NOFFICIAL×POST is not significant. This test further corroborates that our results are driven by 
political connections, not because the resigned directors are weak monitors. 
Second, to address the possibility that unobservable shocks that are unrelated to Rule 18 could 
drive the results, we artificially pick (1) the years 2008 and 2009 as the pre-event period, and 2010 
and 2011 as the post-event period; or (2) the years 2008-2011 as Pre-Event, 2012-2015 as Post-
Event. We do not find a significant difference in FRQ between the treatment and control firms 
around these “pseudo-event” years. The results are shown in Panel B of Table 8. 
 
6.3 Other robustness tests 
To further ensure the robustness of our inferences, we implement additional sensitivity 
analyses. First, we investigate whether personal characteristics of directors have any effects. The 
personal characteristics that we examined are described as in Table 2. We include interactions 
between personal characteristics of resigned directors or replacement directors with 
OFFICIAL×POST. The results indicate that the personal characteristics of resigned directors or 
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replacement directors do not affect our inferences. The results are not tabulated. 
Second, we control for any potential confounding effect of concurrent CEO changes, as new 
appointed CEOs may affect firms’ FRQ. We either delete observations with CEO changes during 
our sample period or include an additional control variable to capture the effect of such changes. 
Untabulated analyses show that no conclusions are altered in these tests. 
Finally, we use firms with all resigned directors with no official positions as alternative control 
group. These firms have director changes, but the resigned directors have no political connection. 
This is to eliminate the possibility that any new directors will lead to improvement in FRQ. 
Untabulated analyses show that our inferences remain the same. 
 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we examine firm-level effects of China’s anti-corruption campaign. More 
specifically, we utilize a natural experiment in which more than 400 official directors were 
mandated to resign, effectively severing the political connections of those firms. We examine FRQ 
in the pre- and post- event periods using a difference-in-differences approach combined with 
propensity-score matching and firm and year fixed effects. Our results indicate that compared to 
control firms, the FRQ (measuring firm-level financial transparency) of firms with politically-
connected directors increases after those directors resign. The results are consistent with the idea 
that politically-connected directors negatively affect FRQ. More broadly, our findings suggest that 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
  
 
political connections negatively affect the quality of firm-provided information. Our results are 
robust to a variety of robustness checks. 
We further examine how the institutional environment influences the effects of the anti-
corruption campaign. The results show that firms have a stronger response to the anti-corruption 
campaign when they are located in regions with more developed financial markets and higher 
judicial efficiency. Further, firms improve their FRQ more when they are non-state-owned, when 
they previously received preferential access to financing, or when they face refinancing pressure. 
Our study contributes to the understanding of the effects of China’s anti-corruption campaign in 
general and to research on the effects of political connections on firm-level FRQ in particular. 
Future research could examine whether China’s anti-corruption campaign affects other firm-level 
activities and the efficiency of capital allocation. 
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APPENDIX A:  
Procedure to construct the propensity-score-matched sample 
 
Dependent Variable = Resigned Official Directors 
VARIABLES Coefficient Z 
SIZE 0.1455 1.07 
LEV 1.2831* 1.95 
PPE 0.4638 1.15 
SDSALE 1.1096** 2.37 
BETA 0.6002** 2.00 
DIVIDEND 0.1687 0.93 
AGE 0.4233* 1.85 
CONCENTRATION -0.1290 -0.28 
INSIDER 0.0049 0.01 
BOARDSIZE 0.8493** 2.16 
INDPRO 2.4789* 1.85 
AF 0.0561 0.38 
ANALYSTS -0.0412 -0.48 
ROA -1.3103 -0.86 
RETURN 0.1455 0.84 
MB -0.0373 -0.64 
SOE -0.0975 -0.60 
Region Fixed Effects YES  
Observations 1958  
Pseudo R2 0.067  
 
Notes: The PSM approach involves pairing treatment and comparison units that are similar in terms 
of their observable characteristics (Dehejia and Wahba 2002). We implement this procedure by first 
estimating a logit regression to model the probability of being affected by Rule 18 (i.e., firms with 
resigned official directors). We use all of the control variables in equation (1) as our predictors. The 
table presents the results from the logit model. * and ** indicate statistical significance at the 10 
percent and 5 percent levels, respectively. Next, we estimate the propensity score for each firm 
using the predicted probabilities from the logit model. We then match each treatment firm to the 
control firm using nearest neighborhood technique with no replacement.   
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APPENDIX B:  
Variable definitions 
 
Variables  Definitions 
|DA1| The absolute value of discretionary accruals, calculated using the Jones model 
(Dechow et al., 1995). Specifically, we estimate the following model in each year-
industry: Acc𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽1(1/𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1)  + 𝛽𝛽2∆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
where Accit is the total accruals, calculated as net income before extraordinary 
items minus total cash flow from operation; TAi,t-1 is the lagged total assets; ΔSit is 
change in sales; PPEit is property, plant, and equipment. All scaled using lagged 
total assets. Discretionary accruals are calculated using the estimated coefficients 
with adjustments for the change of accounts receivable. 
|DA2| The absolute value of discretionary accruals, calculated using the performance-
adjusted model (Kothari et al. 2005). Specifically, we estimate the following model 
in each year-industry: Acc𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽1(1/𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1)  + 𝛽𝛽2(∆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − ∆𝑇𝑇𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) + 𝛽𝛽3𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
where Accit is the total accruals, calculated as net income before extraordinary 
items minus total cash flow from operation; TAi,t-1 is the lagged total assets; ΔSit is 
change in sales; ΔARit is change in account receivable; PPEit is property, plant, and 
equipment. All scaled using lagged total assets. ROAit is return on assets. The 
residuals from the regressions are used to measure discretionary accruals. 
|REM| The absolute value of real earnings management following Roychowdhury (2006). 
Specifically, we estimate the following models in each year-industry:  
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽1(1/𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1)  + 𝛽𝛽2𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3∆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽1(1/𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1)  + 𝛽𝛽2𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝑅𝑅𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝛽𝛽1(1/𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑇𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1)  + 𝛽𝛽2𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽3∆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4∆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖,𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  
where CFOit is operating cash flow; DEXPit is discretionary expenditures; PRODit 
is production costs; TAi,t-1 is the lagged total assets; Sit is sales; ΔSit is change in 
sales; Si,t-1 is the lagged sales; ΔSi,t-1 is lagged change in sales; all scaled using 
lagged total assets. The residuals from the regressions (i.e. DCFO, DDEXP, 
DPROD) are discretionary levels of real earnings management. We then follow 
Zang (2011) and Chen et al. (2015) to combine three measures into one combined 
measure, i.e. |REM|= |DPROD - DCFO - DDEXP|; 
FRQ1 Standardized financial reporting quality measure based on |DA1|. We multiply (-1) 
by |DA1|, and then subtract the mean and divide by the standard deviation; 
FRQ2 Standardized financial reporting quality measure based on |DA2|. We multiply (-1) 
by |DA2|, and then subtract the mean and divide by the standard deviation; 
FRQ3 Standardized financial reporting quality measure based on |REM|. We multiply (-1) 
by |REM|, and then subtract the mean and divide by the standard deviation; 
FRQ Aggregate measure of financial reporting quality, calculated as the average of the 
above three standardized measures, i.e.  
𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹 = 1
3
× (𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹1 + 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹2 + 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐹𝐹3); 
OFFICIAL Indicator variable for official director, equal to 1 if the firm has resigned official 
directors due to Rule 18, and 0 otherwise; 
POST Indicator variable for post-policy period, equal to 1 if it is year 2014 or 2015, and 0 
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otherwise; 
SIZE Firm size, calculated as the natural logarithm of firm’s market capitalization at the 
year end; 
LEV Financial Leverage, calculated as long-term liabilities divided by total assets; 
PPE Fixed assets, calculated as Property, Plant and Equity divided by total assets; 
SDSALE The standard deviation of sales, calculated as the standard deviation of sales 
(deflated by total assets) in the previous five years. We require at least three 
observations to estimate the variable; 
BETA Beta of the stock, obtained from the China Stock Market and Accounting Research 
(CSMAR) database; 
DIVIDEND Indicator variable for dividend payment, equal to 1 if the firm pays dividend, and 0 
otherwise; 
AGE Firm age, calculated as the natural logarithm of years that the firm has established; 
CONCENTRATION Ownership concentration, proxied by the percentage of shares held by the three 
largest shareholders. 
INSIDER Insider shareholding, calculated as shares held by managers divided by total shares 
outstanding; 
BOARDSIZE Board size, calculated as the natural logarithm of the number of board directors; 
INDPRO The percentage of independent directors, calculated as the number of independent 
directors as a percentage of total board directors; 
AF Audit fee, calculated as the natural logarithm of audit fee paid to the auditor; 
ANALYSTS Number of analyst following, calculated as the natural logarithm of one plus the 
number of analysts following the firm; 
ROA Return on assets, calculated as net income divided by the average total asset; 
RETURN Stock return, represents the annual stock return of the firm; 
MB Market-to-book ratio, calculated as the assets minus book equity plus market equity, 
divided by the assets at the year end; 
SOE Indicator variable for state-owned enterprise, equal to 1 if the ultimate controlling 
shareholder is the state, and 0 otherwise; 
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TABLE 1 
Sample Selection 
 
  Number of Firms 
Number of Resigned 
Directors 
All firms listed on the Main and SME Boards of 
Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share stock exchanges 2136 
 Non-financial firms  2090 
 Firms with resigned directors due to Rule18 613 819 
Excluding firms with resigned directors from 
universities, publically funded organizations, or 
SOEs (298) (418) 
Firms with resigned official directors 315 401 
    Excluding firms with missing variables or no PSM 
control firms (29) (33) 
Treated firms in our sample 286 368 
 
Notes: This table describes the sample selection process. For the number of resigned directors, 
when a person serves as director for two firms, we count as two. 
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TABLE 2 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Panel A: Comparison between treated firms and control firms 
 Treatment Group 
Control Group  
(No PSM) 
Treatment-Control 
(No PSM) 
Control Group 
(PSM) 
Treatment-Control 
(PSM) 
VARIABLES N Mean N Mean Difference N Mean Difference 
SIZE 286 22.3811 1663 22.2114 0.1697 *** 286 22.4312 -0.0501 
LEV 286 0.1169 1663 0.0946 0.0223 *** 286 0.1144 0.0025 
PPE 286 0.2590 1663 0.2417 0.0173 286 0.2465 0.0125 
SDSALE 286 0.1462 1663 0.1310 0.0152 * 286 0.1579 -0.0117 
BETA 286 1.1088 1663 1.0757 0.0331 ** 286 1.0988 0.0100 
DIVIDEND 286 0.7273 1663 0.7011 0.0262 286 0.7378 -0.0105 
AGE 286 2.7869 1663 2.7429 0.0440 * 286 2.7632 0.0237 
CONCENTRATION 286 0.4931 1663 0.4854 0.0077 286 0.4832 0.0099 
INSIDER 286 0.0656 1663 0.0825 -0.0169 286 0.0605 0.0051 
BOARDSIZE 286 2.1972 1663 2.1624 0.0348 *** 286 2.1917 0.0055 
INDPRO 286 0.3743 1663 0.3714 0.0029 286 0.3758 -0.0015 
AF 286 13.8325 1663 13.6833 0.1492 *** 286 13.8030 0.0295 
ANALYSTS 286 2.0535 1663 1.9720 0.0815 286 2.0597 -0.0062 
ROA 286 0.0349 1663 0.0371 -0.0022 286 0.0396 -0.0047 
RETURN 286 0.1979 1663 0.2137 -0.0158 286 0.2044 -0.0065 
MB 286 1.9324 1663 2.1237 -0.1913 * 286 2.0560 -0.1236 
SOE 286 0.5350 1663 0.4678 0.0672 ** 286 0.5245 0.0105 
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TABLE 2 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Treated firms with propensity-score matched firms as control sample 
 N Mean SD P25 P50 P75 
|DA1| 2200 0.057 0.057 0.019 0.039 0.074 
|DA2| 2200 0.053 0.053 0.018 0.037 0.070 
|REM| 2200 0.126 0.117 0.040 0.094 0.174 
FRQ1 2200 -0.003 1.005 -0.300 0.315 0.669 
FRQ2 2200 0.007 1.008 -0.320 0.307 0.674 
FRQ3 2200 0.043 0.979 -0.357 0.310 0.765 
FRQ 2200 0.016 0.822 -0.255 0.250 0.566 
SIZE 2200 22.662 0.975 21.952 22.553 23.246 
LEV 2200 0.116 0.113 0.019 0.081 0.188 
PPE 2200 0.250 0.179 0.110 0.213 0.363 
SDSALE 2200 0.150 0.160 0.055 0.099 0.173 
BETA 2200 1.127 0.241 0.969 1.148 1.291 
DIVIDEND 2200 0.557 0.497 0 1 1 
AGE 2200 2.808 0.331 2.639 2.833 3.045 
CONCENTRATION 2200 0.480 0.161 0.350 0.476 0.599 
INSIDER 2200 0.059 0.136 0.000 0.000 0.011 
BOARDSIZE 2200 2.184 0.208 2.079 2.197 2.197 
INDPRO 2200 0.373 0.054 0.333 0.364 0.400 
AF 2200 13.863 0.738 13.385 13.710 14.221 
ANALYSTS 2200 2.043 1.126 1.099 2.197 2.996 
ROA 2200 0.035 0.055 0.010 0.029 0.059 
RETURN 2200 0.317 0.489 -0.027 0.219 0.557 
MB 2200 2.292 1.853 1.243 1.717 2.542 
SOE 2200 0.534 0.499 0 1 1 
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TABLE 2 (continued) 
 
Panel C: Resigned director backgrounds 
 Number Percentage 
In charge of related industry 161 40.15% 
National level rank 146 36.41% 
From the same region as the company  348 86.78% 
Male 356 88.78% 
Retired 81 20.20% 
Total resigned official directors 401  
Panel D: Successor director backgrounds 
 Number Percentage 
From same industry 120 30.08% 
Accounting, finance or tax  215 53.88% 
Banking 24 6.02% 
Law 60 15.04% 
At least belong to one of 
above categories 363 90.98% 
Male  332 83.21% 
Retired 18 4.51% 
Total successor directors 399  
 
Notes: This table reports descriptive statistics. Panel A provides comparison between 
treatment firms and control firms. The observations and statistics are at the firm level for the 
year before Rule 18. Panel B reports descriptive statistics of key independent, dependent, 
and control variables for the main sample, including treatment firms and propensity-score 
matched firms.  The observations and statistics are at the firm-year level. Panel C reports the 
characteristics of resigned directors. Panel D reports the characteristics of successor. Please 
see Appendix B for variable definitions.  *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 
the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
  
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
  
 
TABLE 3 
Anti-corruption campaign and financial reporting quality 
 
Panel A: All non-treatment firms as control firms 
 FRQ FRQ1 FRQ2 FRQ3 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
OFFICIAL×POST 0.2182*** 0.2115*** 0.2083*** 0.2552*** 0.2579*** 0.1117** 
 (4.98) (4.63) (4.55) (4.26) (4.62) (2.46) 
OFFICIAL -0.0613      
 (-1.55)      
POST 0.0807*** 0.0789***     
 (3.56) (2.59)     
SIZE -0.0371* -0.2413*** -0.2930*** -0.3002*** -0.1982*** -0.3806*** 
 (-1.78) (-4.72) (-5.41) (-4.28) (-2.86) (-6.53) 
LEV -0.1111 -0.5890** -0.5787** -0.5948* -0.7083** -0.4329* 
 (-0.83) (-2.28) (-2.23) (-1.93) (-2.23) (-1.67) 
PPE 0.3795*** 0.7293*** 0.7259*** 0.8490*** 0.7642*** 0.5645*** 
 (5.00) (4.07) (4.06) (3.47) (3.10) (3.01) 
SDSALE -1.0508*** -0.2833 -0.2659 -0.2995 -0.3924* -0.1058 
 (-10.24) (-1.54) (-1.43) (-1.41) (-1.67) (-0.49) 
BETA 0.1619*** 0.1075** 0.0574 0.0934 0.0433 0.0356 
 (3.74) (2.14) (1.05) (1.32) (0.63) (0.63) 
DIVIDEND 0.1284*** -0.0029 0.0411 0.0485 0.0494 0.0253 
 (5.45) (-0.11) (1.38) (1.28) (1.31) (0.84) 
AGE -0.0250 0.5831*** 0.2463 0.4471 0.0457 0.2463 
 (-0.72) (2.71) (0.86) (1.31) (0.13) (0.81) 
CONCENTRATION -0.1211 -0.6470*** -0.6426*** -0.7187** -0.8327*** -0.3762 
 (-1.61) (-2.77) (-2.75) (-2.44) (-2.80) (-1.34) 
INSIDER 0.0619 0.4284* 0.3899 0.3399 0.4287 0.4010 
 (0.85) (1.78) (1.64) (1.09) (1.36) (1.39) 
BOARDSIZE 0.0414 0.0263 0.0296 0.0940 0.0222 -0.0275 
 (0.63) (0.18) (0.21) (0.54) (0.13) (-0.18) 
INDPRO 0.1792 -0.3975 -0.4266 -0.5294 -0.6577 -0.0926 
 (0.80) (-1.10) (-1.18) (-1.18) (-1.45) (-0.24) 
AF 0.0546** -0.0450 -0.0446 -0.0481 -0.0921 0.0063 
 (2.42) (-0.81) (-0.80) (-0.67) (-1.25) (0.10) 
ANALYSTS 0.0381*** 0.0724*** 0.0763*** 0.0744** 0.0696** 0.0848*** 
 (2.90) (2.84) (2.98) (2.33) (2.23) (3.10) 
ROA -2.2156*** -1.3163*** -1.2361*** -0.5634 -1.9899*** -1.1550*** 
 (-7.39) (-3.14) (-2.93) (-0.95) (-4.03) (-2.75) 
RETURN -0.0159 0.0263 0.0431 0.0554 0.0084 0.0656** 
 (-0.67) (0.93) (1.47) (1.45) (0.22) (2.13) 
MB -0.0334*** 0.0054 0.0018 0.0030 0.0158 -0.0134 
 (-3.96) (0.39) (0.13) (0.17) (0.90) (-0.85) 
SOE 0.0701*** -0.0250 -0.0223 0.0320 0.0163 -0.1152 
 (2.58) (-0.17) (-0.15) (0.17) (0.09) (-0.74) 
Year FE  NO NO YES YES YES YES 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved.
  
 
Industry FE YES NO NO NO NO NO 
Firm FE NO YES YES YES YES YES 
Observations 7745 7745 7745 7745 7745 7745 
Adjusted R2 0.131 0.301 0.303 0.236 0.227 0.486 
 
TABLE 3 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Propensity matched firms as control firms 
 Dependent Variable = FRQ 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
OFFICIAL×POST 0.2038*** 0.1791*** 0.1748***  
 (3.29) (2.88) (2.80)  
OFFICIAL 0.0005    
 (0.01)    
POST 0.0826 0.0670   
 (1.61) (1.06)   
OFFICIAL*Y2012    -0.0149 
    (-0.21) 
OFFICIAL*Y2013    0.0125 
    (0.20) 
OFFICIAL*Y2014    0.2080*** 
    (3.21) 
OFFICIAL*Y2015    0.2011*** 
    (3.15) 
     
Other Controls YES YES YES YES 
Year FE  NO NO YES YES 
Industry FE YES NO NO YES 
Firm FE NO YES YES NO 
Observations 2200 2200 2200 2200 
Adjusted R2 0.137 0.330 0.330 0.138 
 
Notes: This table reports our main results of the impact of the anti-corruption campaign on 
financial reporting quality. In Panel A, we present the results using all non-treatment firms as 
control firms. Model (1)-(3) use the aggregate measure of financial reporting quality (FRQ) 
as the dependent variable, and include industry fixed effects, firm fixed effects, firm and year 
fixed effects respectively. Model (4)-(6) use three individual financial reporting quality 
measures as dependent variable, and include firm and year fixed effects. In Panel B we 
present the results using PSM firms as control firms. Please see Appendix B for variable 
definitions. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. T-statistics are presented in 
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parentheses.*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10 percent, 5 percent, and 1 
percent levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 4 
The influence of institutional development 
 
  Financing Marketization Judicial Efficiency 
 Predicted Sign High Low High Low 
OFFICIAL×POST  0.3348*** 0.0219 0.3767*** 0.0423 
  (3.79) (0.25) (3.53) (0.54) 
Difference: High-Low + 0.3129** 0.3344** 
  Z-statistic=2.53 Z-statistic=2.53 
      
Other Controls   YES YES YES YES 
Year FE   YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE  YES YES YES YES 
Observations  1007 1193 800 1400 
Adjusted R2  0.277 0.365 0.248 0.369 
 
Notes: This table reports the results of the influence of institutional development on anti-
corruption effects. In the first two columns, the sample firms are partitioned into sub-samples 
based on the median values of financing marketization degree compiled by Fan et al. (2011). 
In the next two columns, the sample firms are partitioned into sub-samples based on the 
median values of judicial efficiency ranking developed by Word Bank in Doing Business in 
China Report. The dependent variable is the aggregate measure of financial reporting quality. 
Please see Appendix B for variable definitions. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
T-statistics are presented in parentheses. ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 5 
percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 5 
The influence of firm characteristics 
 
Panel A: Ownership type 
 Predicted Sign Non-SOE SOE 
OFFICIAL×POST  0.3416*** 0.0153 
  (3.24) (0.22) 
Difference: Non-SOE - SOE + 0.3263*** 
  Z-statistic=2.58 
    
Other Controls   YES YES 
Year FE   YES YES 
Firm FE  YES YES 
Observations  1026 1174 
Adjusted R2  0.272 0.410 
Panel B: Financing characteristics 
 Cost of Debt Refinancing Pressure 
 
Predicted  
Sign High Low 
Predicted  
Sign High Low 
OFFICIAL×POST  0.0400 0.3302***  0.3032*** 0.0274 
  (0.42) (3.89)  (3.49) (0.32) 
Difference: 
High-Low 
- -0.2902** + 0.2758** 
 Z-statistic=2.27  Z-statistic=2.26 
       
Other Controls   YES YES  YES YES 
Year FE   YES YES  YES YES 
Firm FE  YES YES  YES YES 
Observations  989 972  1098 1102 
Adjusted R2  0.319 0.315  0.302 0.375 
 
Notes: This table reports the results of the influence of firm characteristics on anti-corruption 
effects. In panel A, the sample firms are partitioned into sub-samples based on whether the 
ultimate controlling shareholder is the state or not. In panel B, the sample firms are 
partitioned into sub-samples based on firm characteristics about financing. In the first two 
columns, the partition variable is the cost of debt (COD), calculated as interest expense 
divided by the amount of interest-bearing debt in the year before the event. In the next two 
columns, the partition variable is the refinancing pressure (RP), calculated as short term bank 
loans as a percentage of total debt. The dependent variable is the aggregate measure of 
financial reporting quality. Please see Appendix B for variable definitions. Standard errors 
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are clustered at the firm level. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. ** and *** indicate 
statistical significance at the 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 6 
The other consequences of the anti-corruption campaign and the moderating effects of FRQ 
 
Panel A: The effects on government subsidy and long term loan 
 Subsidy 
(1) 
Long-term Loan 
(2) 
OFFICIAL×POST -0.1646** -0.0169** 
 (-1.98) (-2.49) 
   
Other Controls YES YES 
Year FE  YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES 
Observations 2158 2148 
Adjusted R2 0.768 0.814 
 
 
Panel B: The Effects on Public Financing and the Moderating effects of FRQ 
   ΔFRQ 
 Predicted Sign Full Sample High  Low 
OFFICIAL×POST  0.0037 0.0215** -0.0112 
  (0.61) (2.34) (-1.41) 
Difference: High-
Low 
+  0.0327*** 
  Z-statistic=2.69 
     
Other Controls  YES YES YES 
Year FE   YES YES YES 
Firm FE  YES YES YES 
Observations  2140 1069 1071 
Adjusted R2  0.050 0.054 0.066 
 
Notes: The table reports the effects of anti-corruption campaign on government subsidy, long 
term bank loan, and public financing. For Model (1) of Panel A, the dependent variable is the 
natural logarithm of government subsidies; For Model (2) of Panel A, the dependent variable 
is long-term bank loans as a percentage of total liability. For Panel B, the dependent variable 
is total public financing as a percentage of total assets. The sample is divided into two 
subgroups based on the median of the change of financial reporting quality (FRQ) from pre-
event period to post-event period. We include control variables following the literature. 
Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. T-statistics are presented in parentheses. ** 
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 5 percent and 1 percent levels, respectively.  
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TABLE 7 
Potential confounding events 
 
 Eight-Point Regulation Market Liberalization 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
OFFICIAL×POST 0.1751*** 0.1507** 0.1757*** 0.1973*** 
 (2.79) (2.14) (2.81) (2.82) 
ETC 1.0782    
 (0.78)    
Market Liberalization   0.0455  
   (0.64)  
     
Other Controls YES YES YES YES 
Year FE  YES YES YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES YES YES 
Observations 2200 1680 2200 1657 
Adjusted R2 0.330 0.350 0.330 0.353 
 
Notes: This table presents results controlling for two potential confounding events. The first 
two columns present results controlling for Eight-Point Regulation. In Model (1) we add 
Entertainment and Traveling Costs (ETC) as a control variable; in Model (2), we exclude 
observations of the year 2012 from our sample to assure that our sample is after the Eight-
point Regulation. The next two columns present results controlling for the market 
liberalization. In model (3), we include an indicator variable equal to one if the stocks are 
opened to direct trade by Hong Kong and international investors; in model (4) we exclude 
observations in the year 2015 from our sample to assure that our sample is prior to the market 
liberalization. The dependent variable is the aggregate measure of financial reporting quality. 
Please see Appendix B for variable definitions. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
T-statistics are presented in parentheses. ** and *** indicate significance at the 5 percent and 
1 percent levels, respectively.  
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TABLE 8 
Placebo analyses 
 
Panel A: The effects of non-official directors’ resignations 
 (1) 
NOFFICIAL×POST -0.0638 
 (-1.18) 
  
Other Controls YES 
Year FE  YES 
Firm FE YES 
Observations 2069 
Adjusted R2 0.356 
Panel B: Results using pseudo-event years 
 (1) (2) 
OFFICIAL×POST -0.0363 -0.0157 
 (-0.47) (-0.27) 
   
Other Controls YES YES 
Year FE  YES YES 
Firm FE YES YES 
Observations 1342 3053 
Adjusted R2 0.287 0.259 
 
 
Notes: This table presents two sets of placebo analyses. In Panel A, we use firms with 
resigned directors from universities, publicly-funded organizations or SOEs as Pseudo treated 
group. NOFFICIAL is an indicator variable which equals to 1 if the firm has forcedly 
resigned director from non-government organizations and 0 otherwise. In Panel B, we use 
two different years as “pseudo-event” years. In model (1), we pick the years 2008 and 2009 
as the pre-event period, and 2010 and 2011 as the post-event period. In model (2), we use the 
years 2008-2011 as pre-event period, and 2012-2015 as post-event period. The dependent 
variable is the aggregate measure of financial reporting quality. Please see Appendix B for 
variable definitions. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. T-statistics are presented 
in parentheses. 
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